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A major concern of public employees today is the guarantee
of fair treatment in their employment. This guarantee, or due
process, is secured through the institution of procedures whereby
employees can have those discipline-related actions reviewed that
they consider to be unfair or in violation of their rights as employ-
ees. A truly effective employee review procedure would further
provide that complaints or grievances not settled through
employer-employee accommodation be submitted to an impartial
third party for adjudication.
The majority of states, including those in the southeastern
United States,1 have provided their employees with such review
procedures. 2 These civil service or statutory review procedures
vary widely in form, scope, and effectiveness. Jurisdictions where
collective bargaining by public employees is allowed provide a
second method of review-the grievance procedure pursuant to a
union contract.' This negotiated grievance procedure typically
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1. Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia will be considered
as the Southeastern States throughout this analysis.
2. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2207 (Supp. 1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 98:15
(Cum. Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-40 (Cum. Supp. 1975); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 124.33 (Page Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-3227 (1973).
3. Among the 18 states with comprehensive public bargaining laws, see note 69 infra,
contract grievance procedures are permitted in the following states: ALASKA STAT. §
23.40.210 (1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.041 (Harrison 1977); HAw. REv. STAT. § 89-10(a)
(Supp. 1975); IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West Cum. Supp.
1977); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 26, § 965(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976), § 979-K (1964); MASs. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 8 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.211-
.215 (1967 & Cum. Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.70(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:4 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West Cum.
1
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culminates in binding arbitration by an impartial third party
selected by both the employer and the employee representative.
In the southeastern United States, with the exception of
Florida,4 public employees have no statutory right to bargain
collectively. Few public employees in these states can resort to a
contractual grievance arbitration to obtain an impartial third
party review of their discipline-related grievances, as the union
is not allowed to act as a bargaining agent for these employees.
Therefore, the only guarantee of due process generally available
to public employees in Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Virginia is the statutory:civil service review mechanisms.
5
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bishop v. Wood'
could be interpreted as support for the proposition that, without
a specific statutory grant, public employees have no right to an
impartial review of their employment-related grievances. 7 How-
ever, public officials should not consider this opinion as giving
them the power to deny to public employees their due process
rights.' The guarantee of due process in one's employment
through the union's collectively bargained grievance procedure is
one of the most important benefits unionization offers employ-
ees.' The view generally held in the Southeast, that collective
bargaining is inappropriate in the public sector,"0 obligates public
Supp. 1977); N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §§ 203, 208.1(a) (McKinney 1973); OR. REv. STAT. §
243.706 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.606, .903 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 904(a)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN...§§ 111.86, .91(3) (West
1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
4. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.401 (Harrison 1977).
5. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2207 (Supp, 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-17-20 (1976); N.C.
GlN. STAT. §§ 126-34 to -37 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-114.5, 15.1-7.1 (Supp. 1977).
6. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). This case involved a permanent municipal employee who was
discharged without a pretermination hearing. The reasons for the discharge were not
publicly disclosed, nor were they made known to any prospective employers. The dis-
charged employee filed suit claiming that the employer's action deprived him of a property
interest without due process, as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court denied his claim and held that hd, as a public employee, did not have a protected
property right to his job. Therefore, the Court ruled in this case that, absent a statutory
or contractual guarantee, the discharged employee did not have a constitutionally pro-
tected right to a pretermination hearing.
7. Id. at 346-47.
8. This is not to contend that such a posture by state legislatures is in evidence, but
the absence of bargaining rights and meaningful appeal systems for local governmental
employees in many states indicates that such a possibility is not imagined.
9. See generally H. DAvEY, CONTEMPORARY COLLECrIvE BARGAINING 141-90 (3d ed.
1972).
10. This is evidenced by the fact that only Florida has a comprehensive bargaining
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managers and legislators in this region to provide as an alterna-
tive a statutory review procedure that will guarantee fair treat-
ment to their employees. Enlightened state legislators and ad-
ministrators in the Southeast must, therefore, consider whether
existing statutory review procedures provide public employees
with a full and equitable guarantee of fair treatment in their
employment.
Since the primary alternative to a statutory review procedure
is contractual grievance arbitration, the issue of whether the ex-
isting statutory review procedure adequately protects the public
employees' rights is determined by comparing the efficacy of
these two procedures. For the purposes of this study, it is neces-
sary to view contractual grievance arbitration in the abstract, as
a dispute resolution technique, without regard to the fact that it
normally emerges as a result of collective bargaining. The focus
of investigation, therefore, will be upon the finality and nature of
the statutory civil service adjudication vis-4-vis contractual
grievance arbitration by a mutually acceptable, neutral third
party.
1I. DEScRIPTION OF THE STUDY
A key factor in determining the effectiveness of a dispute
resolution technique is the degree of finality maintained by the
adjudications made under that procedure. The finality of an ini-
tial adjudicative decision is determined by two factors:" the num-
ber of levels of review to which the decision is subject and the
extent to which such review reaches the merits of the initial adju-
dication. 2 If one assumes that the adjudication that is rendered
under a review or grievance procedure is fair and objective, then
it is clearly in the interest of both the employer and the employee
to achieve a final resolution as soon as possible.
Consequently, the initial aim of this investigation will be to
determine which mechanism, either the statutory review proce-
dure or the grievance arbitration pursuant to a union contract,
produces decisions that possess the higher degree of finality. As
11. See Jones, The Name of the Game Is Decision-Some Reflections on
"Arbitrability" and "Authority" in Labor Arbitration, 46 Txos L. REv. 865 (1968).
12. When the term "initial adjudication" or "initial adjudicative stage" is used, the
authors are referring to that step in the review procedure where a third party from without
the organizational structure or the bargaining relationship is called upon to make a deter-
mination to resolve a dispute.
1978]
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noted above, contractual grievance arbitration is not widely uti-
lized in the Southeastern States. Thus, in order to achieve fully
the objective of the first phase of this study, it is necessary to
analyze the review procedures as they exist in several jurisdic-
tions where both contractual grievance arbitration and the statu-
tory review procedures are well established as the means of resolv-
ing discipline-related disputes.
For the purposes of this analysis, the grievance and review
procedures serving as comparative models will consist of those
procedures extant in the federal government and the states of
Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The four
states have comprehensive public employee collective bargaining
laws, 3 which either sanction or require binding arbitration as the
concluding step in the contractual grievance procedure. 4 The
legal framework for collective bargaining in the federal govern-
ment, embodied in Executive Order No. 11,491 [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Order 11,491],'1 permits limited grievance arbitration
pursuant to a union contract. Each of the five governmental units
in the sample group also has a statutory civil service review proce-
dure for its employees. The four states and the federal govern-
ment thus' have had extensive experience dealing with public
employee grievances through both the contractual grievance arbi-
tration and the statutory review procedures. The breadth of expe-
rience within these four sample states and the federal govern-
ment, along with the representative nature of their statutory re-
view procedures, provides a meaningful comparison with the
practice existent in the Southeastern States.
As a result of this analysis, observations will be made as to
which of the procedures produces the greater finality and the
fewer levels of substantive review of the initial adjudicative deci-
sion. Based upon these observations and other relevant considera-
13. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 203
(McKinney 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.606, .903 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.86, .91(3) (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
14. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.70(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §
203 (McKinney 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.606, .903 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.86, .91(3) (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
15. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1969), as amended by Exec. Order No.
11,838, 3A C.F.R. 126 (1975). Executive Order No. 11,491, promulgated by President
Nixon in October 1969, grants "meet and confer" bargaining rights to most federal em-
ployees. This order replaced Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 Compila-
tion), which first granted bargaining rights to federal employees and was promulgated by
President Kennedy in October 1962,
[Vol. 29
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tions, conclusions will be reached as to the efficacy of grievance
arbitration vis--vis statutory civil service alternatives.
Following these conclusions, the focus of the study will shift
to the southeastern United States. The due process guarantees
available to state employees in the Southeast will be enumerated
and evaluated. The study will conclude with the formulation of
a proposed statutory review mechanism for state employees. This
model grievance or review procedure will seek to maximize the
guarantee of due process for the public employees while retaining
a workable and acceptable environment for public sector labor
relations in the Southeast.
Ill. THE LEGAL STATUS OF RIGHTS ARBITRATION AwARDS
The treatment of grievance arbitration in public sector labor
relations closely parallels the treatment given to it in the private
sector. For this reason, the substantive federal labor law, which
specifies the legal status of a union-negotiated grievance arbitra-
tion in the private sector, is summarized below.
A. The Private Sector Treatment
Federal law regarding private sector grievance procedures is
based primarily upon section 203(d) and section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 [hereinafter referred to as
LMRA].'6 Section 203(d) provides, in part, that: "Final adjust-
ment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising
over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-
bargaining agreement."' 7 Regarding the status of union-negoti-
ated procedures, section 301 provides that the parties to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement negotiated under the provisions of the
LMRA may seek enforcement of the contracts by filing suit in an
appropriate federal district court.'8
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,'9 the Supreme
Court held that section 301 may be used to enforce contractual
agreements for the arbitration of unresolved grievances. 0 The
16. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 203(d), 301, 29 U.S.C. 44
173(d), 185 (1970).
17. Id. § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d).
18. Id. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
19. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
20. Id. at 455.
5
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Court cited the extensive legislative history, which placed em-
phasis upon the stabilizing influence such a promise to arbitrate
has upon the employer-union relationship.2' Particularly impor-
tant, in the Court's view, was the fact that the binding arbitration
provisions are typically the quid pro quo for a no-strike pledge by
the employee organization.22 In a similar manner, the Court has
ruled that a recalcitrant employee organization may be com-
pelled, by means of an injunction, to comply with the contractual
no-strike obligations, which are coupled with binding arbitration
provisions.2 Thus, it is clear that recalcitrant private sector em-
ployers and unions can be forced through court action to comply
with contractual arbitration provisions.
In Lincoln Mills, the Court further interpreted section 301 to
be more than jurisdictional in nature. That section was held to
grant the federal courts authority to fashion a body of federal law
for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.24 Exer-
cising that authority, the Supreme Court in 1960 further clarified
the legal status of the contractual grievance arbitration in a series
of cases commonly referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy.
25
In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 21 the
Court greatly enhanced the finality of grievance arbitration when
it ruled that the federal courts cannot review the decision of an
arbitrator as to the merits of a particular grievance.27 Basing its
holding upon the pertinent language of section 203(d) of the
LMRA noted above,28 the Court stated:
The question is not whether in the mind of the court there is
equity in the claim. Arbitration is a stabilizing influence only
as it serves as a vehicle for handling any and all disputes that
arise under the agreement.
• . . The function of the court is very limited when the
parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpre-
tation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether
the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face
21. Id. at 453-54.
22. Id. at 455.
23. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970).
24. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
25. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
26. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
27. Id. at 568.
[Vol. 29
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is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right
or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the arbitra-
tor. In these circumstances the moving party should not be de-
prived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment
and all that it connotes that was bargained for.
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits
of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a partic-
ular claim, or determining whether there is particular language
in the written instrument which will support the claim. The
agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely
those which the court will deem meritorious.
29
The Court, in reaffirming its position on the finality of griev-
ance arbitration awards under the LMRA, in United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,'3 stated: "The refusal of
courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper
approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.
The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would
be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the
awards."
31
In the remaining Steelworkers Trilogy case, United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,32 the Court further
clarified its strong preference for binding arbitration as the better
method for resolving disputes between employers and employee
organizations.3 This decision clearly prevents the parties, in most
cases, from escaping the obligation to arbitrate by seeking judi-
cial review of an arbitrator's decision on the ground of arbitrabil-
ity. The Court also expressed, in dictum, the opinion that arbitra-
tors are more qualified than judges to interpret contract language
and to apply the "common law of the shop, ' 34 which defines the
ground rules for day-to-day employer/employee relations. 5
Thus, when an employer and an employee organization in
the private sector agree to binding arbitration as the final step in
the contractual grievance procedure, they agree in advance to
accept the decision of the arbitrator as to the merits of any dis-
28. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
29. 363 U.S. at 567-68.
30. 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
31. Id. at 596.
32. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
33. Id. at 578.
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pute that arises. They cannot generally turn to the courts for a
complete or substantial review of the arbitrator's decision.36 As
noted above, throughout the case law developed under section 301
and section 203(d) of the LMRA, 31 the theme of the stabilizing
effect upon the employer/employee relationship of a mutually
agreed upon dispute resolution procedure, which possesses a high
degree of finality as its major characteristic, recurrently ap-
pears."
The National Labor Relations Board's policy of a limited
deferral to grievance arbitration in particular unfair labor prac-
tice cases further indicates the preferred status of grievance arbi-
tration as the method of resolving employment-related disputes
in the private sector. The Board will not defer to grievance arbi-
tration in a case that involves an unfair labor practice charge of
discrimination based on union activity.39 In cases not involving
such an alleged discriminatory act, the Board has developed a
policy of deferring to grievance arbitration when:
1. The unfair labor practice dispute is a matter covered by the
collective bargaining agreement;
2. the arbitrator's decision resolves the unfair labor practice
matter;
3. the arbitration proceedings are fair and regular; and
4. the arbitrator's decision is consistent with the policies and
case law developed under the LMRA.4'
To support its policy of limited deferral to arbitration in
regard to unfair labor practice matters, the Board noted that "the
desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of
labor disputes will best be served by [the Board's] recognition
of the arbitrators' award."'" In Collyer Insulated Wire,42 the Board
said the widespread acceptance of arbitration is consistent with
the national labor policy in requiring the parties in such cases
"to honor their contractual obligations rather than, by casting
36. See notes 25-35 and accompanying text supra.
37. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 203(d), 301, 29 U.S.C. §§
173(d), 185 (1970).
38. The Steelworkers Trilogy provides the definitive statement as to the extent to
which the federal courts will review the decision of an arbitrator in a labor dispute.
39. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 102, filed Mar. 16, 1977.
40. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Speilberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
41. Speilberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1080 (1955).
42. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
[Vol. 29
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[the] dispute in statutory terms, to ignore their agreed-upon
procedures.""
From the foregoing, it has been established in the private
sector that a union-negotiated contractual arbitration procedure
is the preferred method of resolving grievance disputes between
employers and employees or their representative organizations.
As illustrated in a survey by the Bureau of National Affairs, over
ninety-five percent of the collective bargaining agreements in the
private sector provide for binding arbitration as the final step in
the grievance procedure." This widespread utilization of arbitra-
tion and the high degree of finality accorded arbitration awards
act to insure that employees who seek the arbitration of adverse
actions taken by their employer will be afforded a prompt adjudi-
cation of their case.
The developing public sector labor law of grievance arbitra-
tion closely follows the developments in the private sector. In
many areas of public employee labor relations, it is often main-
tained that private sector principles are inappropriate, as the
status of the strike" and unit determination,4" for example, is not
recognized. However, grievance adjudication is one area where
the private sector/public sector parallel is widely acknowledged.
The major concerns in public employee grievance adjudication
are the same as those considered essential to an effective griev-
ance resolution in private employment; i.e., the rapid and final
disposition of the grievance, a fair and objective determination,
and a belief by all parties that the process is one that guarantees
an employee's due process. 7
43. Id. at 843.
44. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 51:1-9 (1975).
45. Employees of the federal government are prohibited from engaging in strikes.
Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 19(b)(4), note 15 supra, at 202. It appears that most states also
prohibit their employees from engaging in strikes. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1301
(1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.430 (Vernon Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:13
(Supp. 1975). However, Alaska, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania clearly provide a right to strike
for specified state employees as long as such activity does not injure the public welfare.
ALAKA STAT. §§ 23.40.200(c)-.200(d) (1972); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-12(b) (Supp. 1975);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
Minnesota does not allow its employees to strike. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.64 subd. 1
(West Supp. 1977). However, certain conduct by the employer, defined in MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 179.68 subd. 2(9),.69 subds. 3&5 (West Supp. 1977), may be raised by the employ-
ees as a defense to violations of the prohibition against strikes. Id. § 179.64 subd. 7.
46. See, e.g., Hawaii's and Minnesota's provisions regarding supervisory employee
bargaining units. HAW. REV. STAT., §§ 89-6(a)(2), - 6(a)(4) (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 179.65 subd. 6 (West Supp. 1977).
47. Jones, note 11 supra, at 869.
1978]
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Because of this wide acceptance of contractual grievance ar-
bitration as an effective means of dispute resolution in the private
sector, the relevant statutory provisions and interpretative deci-
sions in the five sample jurisdictions as to the legal status of
grievance arbitration and the finality of such arbitration awards
merit closer examination.
B. Federal Government
Section 13(b) of Executive Order No. 11,491,11 as amended,
specifically permits the use of contractual grievance procedures
for the arbitration of disputes.49 However, several other provisions
of Order 11,491 act to limit substantially the importance of arbi-
tration as a means of resolving discipline-related grievances. Sec-
tion 13(a) s0 stipulates that matters, i.e., grievances, which can be
raised under a "statutory appeals procedure" may not be brought
as a grievance under the procedure contained in a collective bar-
gaining agreement.5
The nature of the contractual arbitration is further restricted
by sections 11(a) and 12 of Order 11,491, which narrow the scope
of collective bargaining agreements.52 These sections require that
the negotiation and administration of agreements be conducted
so that resulting contracts and dispute settlement procedures will
not conflict with:
1. Existing laws and regulations;
2. Federal Personnel Manual53 policies;
3. published agency regulations and policies for which a
compelling need exists, as defined by the Federal Labor Relations
Council;
4. any controlling agreement at a higher level in the agency;
or
48. 3 C.F.R. 191 (1969), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3A C.F.R. 126 (1975).
49. Id. § 15 at 200, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3A C.F.R. at 130.
50. Id., as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3A C.F.R. at 129.
51. Id.
52. Since arbitration is limited by section 13(a) of the order to matters specified in
the agreement, any narrowing of the scope of the negotiations resulting from sections 11(&)
and 12 limits the purview of arbitration under such agreements. Id. §§ 11(a), 12, 13(a) at
198-200, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3A C.F.R. at 128, 129-30.
53. U.S. CwL SERVICE COMM'N, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL (1969). This is an exten-
sive volume of regulations provided by the U.S. Civil Service Commission to serve as
personnel management instructions for the heads of the various federal agencies within
the executive branch of government.
[Vol. 29
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5. any other provisions of the executive order. 4
Whenever, because of the above restrictions, a dispute arises as
to the arbitrability of a particular complaint, the parties by mu-
tual agreement may submit this dispute to arbitration for resolu-
tion.5 If the parties do not resolve the question of whether a
grievance is within the statutory review procedure or not, the
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations is
required by Order 11,491 to decide the issue."
Generally, arbitration awards that arise from a collective
bargaining agreement in the federal sector are subject to initial
review by the Federal Labor Relations Council [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the FLRC] .1 The FLRC has the discretion to sustain,
modify, set aside in whole or in part, or remand the decision of
an arbitrator.58 The FLRC regulations provide for review of an
arbitration award only if the award appears to be contrary to:
1. Applicable law;
2. an appropriate regulation;
3. Executive Order No. 11,491; or
4. other grounds accepted by courts in the private sector as
grounds for review. 9
The FLRC has generally endeavored to pursue this policy. 0
However, the narrow scope of collective bargaining and the na-
ture of the review process in the federal sector" have tended to
result in a shift from those principles of review used in the private
sector. Thus, the FLRC has struck down the award of an arbitra-
tor and the contractual provision upon which the award was
based where they interfered with management's right, as pro-
54. Exec. Order No. 11,491, §§ 11(a), 12 at 198, 199-200, as amended by Exec. Order
No. 11,838, 3A C.F.R. at 128 (1975).
55. Executive Order No. 11,491 provides that:
[Qluestions as to whether or not a grievance is on a matter subject to the
grievance procedure in an existing agreement, or is subject to arbitration under
that agreement, may by. agreement of the parties be submitted to arbitration
or may be referred to the Assistant Secretary for decision.
Id. § 13(d) at 200, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3A C.F.R. at 130 (1975).
56. The pertinent language states: "Questions that cannot be resolved by the parties
as to whether or not a grievance is on a matter for which a statutory appeal procedure
exists, shall be referred to the Assistant Secretary for decision." Id.
57. Id. § 13(b). The FLRC is established by section 4 of Exec. Order No. 11,491. Id.
58. Federal Labor Relations Council Review Functions, 5 C.F.R. § 2411.37 (1977).
59. Id. § 2411.32.
60. Miserendino, Arbitration in the Federal Service: The Regulation of Remedies, 30
ARB. J. 129, 130-34 (1975).
61. See notes 49-57 and accompanying text supra.
1978]
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vided in section 12(b)(5) of Order 11,491,62 "to determine the
methods, means, and personnel by which operations are to be
conducted."
3
Another example of the FLRC's interpretation of its scope of
review is provided by its decision in AFGE Local 12 v. United
States Department of Labor.4 In this decision, the FLRC modi-
fied an arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrator had
exceeded his contractual authority by granting relief to non-
grievants as well as to grievants. 5
These two decisions, in addition to the FLRC's standards for
review, indicate that the FLRC review of arbitration awards is an
extensive one. The FLRC maintains, however, that it will only
very hesitantly interfere with an arbitrator's award and will pay
deference to such an award."6 However, the material discussed
above demonstrates that this policy of deference has not been
broadly construed.
From the foregoing discussion, it can reasonably be inferred
that contractual arbitration in the federal public sector does not
enjoy the sanctity accorded it under the body of substantive fed-
eral labor law in the private sector. The scope of the negotiated
grievance procedures is limited by applicable law, agency rules
and regulations, and policies set forth in the Federal Personnel
Manual.6" In addition, the finality of arbitration awards in the
federal public sector is less than complete.
The standards which the FLRC has established for the re-
view of arbitration awards appear to allow that body to delve to
a degree into the merits of a particular case, thereby exceeding
the scope of review permitted by the federal courts in the private
sector."8 The extent to which the FLRC reviews the merits of a
particular case is open to debate. The mandated preemption of
the contractual grievance procedures by the statutory review pro-
cedures, when coupled with this broad scope of review, acts to
62. 3 C.F.R. 191, 200 (1969).
63. Veteran's Administration Hosp., Canandique, N.Y., F.L.R.C. No. 73A-42, Gov'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) RF 21:7015 (1974).
64. F.L.R.C. No. 72A-3, Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) RF 21:7009 (1973).
65. Id.
66. NAGE Local R8-14, F.L.R.C. No. 74A-38, GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) RF
21:7285 (1975); Federal Labor Relations Council Announcement Giving Guidance on Re-
view of Arbitration Awards, [1976] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 665:1-1 to -9.
67. Note 53 supra.
68. See notes 63-67 and accompanying text supra.
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make the finality of arbitration awards in federal public sector
labor relations somewhat tenuous.
C. The State Statutes
Most of the eighteen comprehensive state public employee
collective bargaining laws either require or permit the inclusion
of grievance procedures." This can be demonstrated by examin-
ing the statutes in the sample state jurisdictions. In New York
and Wisconsin, such contractual arbitration provisions are per-
mitted but are not required." The public employee statutes in
Minnesota and Pennsylvania require that binding arbitration be
included as the final step in contractual grievance procedures.7'
When presented with the issue, the courts in these four states
have consistently held that the contractual agreements to arbi-
trate are valid and enforceable.
72
Under the public employee statutes of Minnesota, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, there is no preemption by statu-
tory civil service procedures of contractual grievance procedures
as a means of resolving discipline-related disputes. Thus, unlike
the federal sector, employees in these jurisdictions who are cov-
ered by a collective bargaining agreement have a choice in select-
ing the forum in which they will seek the redress of a discipline-
related grievance.
69. These comprehensive public employee collective bargaining statutes are: ALASKA
STAT. § 23.40.210 (1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468(d) (West 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 447.401 (Harrison 1977); HAW. REv. STAT. § 89-11(a) (Supp. 1975); IND. CODE § 22-6-4-9
(1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.18 (West Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-K
(1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 8 (West Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 423.211 (West 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.70 (West Supp. 1977); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 273-A:4 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. CIV.
SERV. LAW § 203 (McKinney 1973); OR. REv. STAT. § 243.666(2) (1975); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Purdon Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 903, 904 (Supp. 1977);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.080 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.91(a) (West 1974).
70. N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.86 (West 1974).
71. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.70 (West Supp. 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903
(Purdon Supp. 1977).
72. See, e.g., Associated Teachers v. Board of Educ., 33 N.Y.2d 229, 236, 306 N.E.2d
791, 796, 351 N.Y.S.2d 670, 676 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d
122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972); Local 1226, AFSCME v. City of Rhinelander,
35 Wis. 2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30 (1967).
The authors are aware of no reported decisions regarding this issue in either Minne-
sota or Pennsylvania. The reason for this may be the unambiguous language of the public
employee collective bargaining statutes in these states. These statutes clearly require
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In New York, the public employee collective bargaining stat-
ute, the Taylor Law, 3 allows the state employer to enter into
agreements with certified employee representatives. Under such
agreements, the negotiated grievance procedure culminating in
binding arbitration may become the sole means for resolving
discipline-related grievances." In 1973, the state and the Civil
Service Employees Association [hereinafter referred to as the
CSEA] entered into an agreement specifying the contractual
grievance procedure, including binding arbitration, which would
serve as the only procedure available to those state employees
represented by CSEA wishing to appeal disciplinary actions
taken by their employers."
The amendment to the Taylor Law and the subsequent
agreement between the state and the CSEA were challenged on
the basis of the fourteenth amendment provisions guaranteeing
equal protection and due process.7 7 In Antinore v. State,78 the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, unanimously up-
held the constitutionality of the subject sections of the Taylor
Law. In so holding, the court stated:
Indeed, far from violating public policy, the binding arbitration
procedures provided by the agreement between the state and
CSEA must be viewed as advancing the public good by the
expedition of the resolution of disciplinary disputes in a simpler,
more prompt manner than would attend their disposition by one
of the methods provided by sections 75 and 76 of the Civil Ser-
vice Law. Thus the provision "carries out Federal and State
policy favoring arbitration as a means of resolving labor disputes
"170
The agency charged with the administration of the public
employee statute in New York is not granted the authority to
review arbitration awards. 0 This is true of Minnesota"1 and Penn-
73. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAw §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1977).
74. Id. § 204(2).
75. Id. § 26(4). See also Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 61 Misc. 2d 492, 305
N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
76. See Antinore v. State, 49 App. Div. 2d 6, 371 N.Y.S.2d7213 (1975). See generally
note 150 and accompanying text supra.
77. Antinore v. State, 49 App. Div. 2d 6, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 213 (1975).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 11-12, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 217-18 (1975).
80. See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW §§ 7501, 7511 (McKinney 1963).
81. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.70(1) (West Supp. 1977).
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sylvania,82 as well as New York. In these three states, the award
of an arbitrator is open to review only by the appropriate state
courts. 3 The standards for this review are specified in each state's
rules of civil procedure." These standards are substantially
equivalent to the criteria utilized in the private sector. For exam-
ple, the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 5 stipulate the
following grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award:
1. Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the
award;
2. partiality on the part of the arbitrator;
3. action taken by the arbitrator exceeds his authority or
does not result in a final and definite award;
4. absence of a valid agreement to arbitrate; or
5. noncompliance with the agreement to arbitrate."
Of the four states surveyed, only Wisconsin grants the public
sector administrative agency any authority to review an arbitra-
tion award.8" Such a review by the Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Commission [hereinafter referred to as the WERC] is lim-
ited to the following issues:
1. Whether the award was obtained by fraud or corrup-
tion;
2. whether the arbitrator was partial;
3. whether the arbitrator wrongfully refused to postpone
a hearing or hear evidence; and
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 57 (Purdon 1963 & Supp. 1977). MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.72
(West Supp. 1977) provides that the decision of the Public Employee Relations Board
shall be binding unless violative of state or local law. See generally Minnesota State
College Bd. v. Public Employee Relations Bd., 303 Minn. 453, 228 N.W.2d 551 (1975)
(holding that the Board's decisions are not exempt from MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 15.0424 (West
1977), which provides for the judicial review of final agency decisions). N.Y. Civ. SE v.
LAW § 209 (McKinney 1973) also provides that the decisions of the public arbitration panel
shall be binding and final. Cf. Albany Permanent Professional Firefighters Ass'n v. Com-
ing, 51 App. Div. 2d 386, 381 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1976) (review of the panel's decision is
appropriate pursuant to N.Y. Cv. PRAc. LAW §§ 7501-7514 (McKsNEY 1963)).
84. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 7511 (McKinney 1963). See Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v.
Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, 260 N.E.2d 508 (1970) (broadening the
above standards of review).
85. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7511 (McKinney 1963).
86. Id. (b)(1), (2).
87. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.88(1)(West 1974).
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4. whether the arbitrator misused or overstepped his
contractual authority.
88
On the basis of the foregoing, it may be concluded that the
status of the contractual grievance arbitration in the five sample
jurisdictions is generally consistent with practices under the
LMRA, 9 although the federal experience provides a moderate
exception." In three of the states studied, the award of an arbitra-
tor in a dispute over employee rights is reviewable only by the
appropriate state courts.91 In Wisconsin, the initial review is
made by the WERC.9 2 The standards by which this review is
conducted make it clear that the adjudicative bodies do not look
to the merits of particular controversies in making their decisions
to uphold, vacate, or modify arbitration awards. Instead, it ap-
pears that any review is limited primarily to questions of proce-
dural and arbitral regularity. 3
IV. STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE REVIEW OF INTITIAL
ADJUDICATIVE DECISIONS UNDER CIVIL SERVICE PROCEDURES
It is clear from the preceding analysis that a public employee
whose discipline-related complaint is advanced to arbitration can
expect, except in unusual cases, that the decision of the arbitrator
will be final and dispositive of the matter. Most state and federal
employees are granted some form of appeal rights under a statu-
tory civil service procedure. Further, most of these procedures
provide for a hearing outside of the employing agency." There-
fore, when a public employee seeks redress of a discipline-related
complaint through a statutory civil service procedure, and that
review progresses to the adjudication stage, the question of final-
ity arises. As with grievance arbitration, the focus of this overview
is on the administrative and judicial deference given this initial
resolution review.
In the subsequent discussion, the finality of the decision
reached at the initial adjudicative stage in statutory civil service
88. Id. § 298.10(1).
89. See notes 18-47 and accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 49-66 and accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 80-86 and accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 87 & 88 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 69-88 and accompanying text supra.
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review procedures will be investigated. The discussion will center
primarily upon the five sample jurisdictions examined above.
A. The Basic Variations
It is well documented that administrative law, particularly
at the state level, provides for a wide range of procedures and
standings in the relationship between individuals, agencies, and
the courts." Without considering the effect of case law and court
interpretation of the various state civil service provisions at this
time, the predicament of an employee who attempts to read and
understand only the review mechanism in his state needs to be
analyzed. The material below illustrates the often confusing vari-
ety of treatments available in the several states for the adjudica-
tion of an employee's grievance through a statutory civil service
procedure.
Based solely on a reading of the statutory provisions for such
agency action, different mixtures of the following elements may
be available in a particular employee's right of review:
1. The review may be heard by a hearing officer who
makes no award, but presents a report of facts and recom-
mendations to the civil service board.97
2. The review may be heard by a hearing officer who is
empowered to make an award which is appealable to the
civil service board.
98
3. The civil service board itself may make an initial
award after hearing the review and the statute could pro-
vide that the award may be non-reviewable by the
courts. 9
4. The award of the civil service board may be suscepti-
ble to court review on specified grounds only. '
5. The award of the board may be appealed for general
review by the courts.'0 '
96. See, e.g., 1, 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 377, 535-45, 730-33 (1965);
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 396-418 (3d ed. 1972); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 454-55 (1976).
97. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19582 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 76-
47 (Supp. 1975).
98. E.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5316(h), (i) (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEv. REV. STAT. § 284-39
(1973).
99. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 29, § 5949 (1974); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.560 (1975).
100. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 18.272(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
31, § 45 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
101. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 240.563 (1975); W. VA. CODE § 29-6-15 (Supp. 1977).
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The important point is that the panoply of adjudicative struc-
tures represented above reflect only those stated provisions that
might be perceived by an employee. A full understanding of the
adjudicative finality involved in a statutory review procedure
often would not be available to a layman who was not cognizant
of the administrative law within that state. For example, in some
states where no court review is provided, there is a de facto judi-
cial review of an agency's decisions.12 In other states, the courts
take significant liberties with the statutory language in interpret-
ing the permissible scope of review.° 3 This range of judicial treat-
ment serves to increase the variation found in the degree of final-
ity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
However, a complete treatise on the scope of the permissible
judicial review of agency proceedings is beyond the intended pur-
view of this article. Of primary interest is an illustration of the
difference between the court's review of the merits of a contrac-
tual arbitration award and the judicial review of the merits of an
adjudication under a statutory civil service procedure. Conse-
quently, the major procedural grounds which are commonly
available as the basis for appealing an agency decision will not
be discussed.
Some legislatures have successfully managed to insulate cer-
tain agency actions from a review on the merits by the courts.0 4
One approach has been to preclude judicial review by statute. 5
However, the courts would still be able to review the various
questions of law that pertained to agency action, though not those
matters within the agency's discretion.' A second means of lim-
iting judical review would be to commit statutorily certain areas
of action to the agency's discretion, thereby further insulating the
agency's determination on the merits from reconsideration by the
courts. This second method of increasing the finality of the
agency's action is the more prevalent method in those states
which limit judicial review of grievance appeals.07
102. See note 83 supra; notes 103 & 127 and accompanying text infra.
103. See, e.g., Hannifan v. Sachs, 150 Conn. 162, 187 A.2d 253 (1962); Department
of Revenue v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 400, 316 A.2d 676 (1974).
These cases interpreted CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 202 (West 1969) and PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 741.951(c) (Purdon Supp. 1977), respectively, so as not to preclude all forms
of judicial review.
104. See 2 F. COOPER, note 96 supra, at 677-79.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., note 51 supra.
107. Those states that have specifically committed certain areas to the agency's
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B. The Court Review on Substantial Evidence
The award of a civil service board or commission is subject
to some form of judicial review on the merits in most jurisdic-
tions.1 8 The most common standard for review is that of
"substantial evidence." The substantial evidence rule is verbal-
ized in section 706(E) of the Administrative Procedure Act,0 9
which applies to the federal agencies and provides various levels
of guidance for the regulation of state agencies. This act states
that "the reviewing court shall.., hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... unsup-
ported by substantial evidence . . . ."10 The generally accepted
meaning of "substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion.""' Other standards provide for a broader basis of review,
but some form of the substantial evidence rule remains popular
in most civil service cases."
2
However, knowledge of whether a given jurisdiction employs
the substantial evidence doctrine in its review of a civil service
board's decision often establishes little more than a basis for gen-
eralization. As one writer aptly commented regarding the scope
of judicial review for agency action: "Whatever impression a
literal-minded reader may get from the words in the statute book,
the plain reality is that the substantial evidence rule as the courts
apply it is a variable. It is made of rubber, not of wood.""'
C. Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Civil Service Act"' provides for the review
discretion and thus allow only certain issues to be judicially reviewed include Idaho, IDAHO
CODE § 67-5316 (Cum. Supp. 1977), and Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. § 18.272 (Cum. Supp.
1976).
108. See, e.g., notes 100 & 101 and accompanying text supra.
109. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
110. Id.
111. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 193, 229 (1938); K. DAVIS, note 96
supra, at 527.
112. The "clearly erroneous" test is one example. Under this standard, the reviewing
court will overturn an agency finding if the record demonstrates that there was a mistake
in judgment, even though the record contains evidence which supports the agency's deci-
sion. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1947). The MODEL
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDuRE Acr § 15(g) contains the "clearly erroneous" test rather
than the "substantial evidence" test. However, this test does not appear to be widely used
in personnel actions and procedures. See generally, e.g., notes 97-101 supra.
113. K. DAVIS, note 96 supra, at 530.
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 741.1-.1002 (Purdon 1963 & Supp. 1977).
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of a disciplinary action taken against an employee in the classi-
fied service." '5 If an employee requests the review of a disciplinary
action and this review proceeds to adjudication, the Act specifies
that the initial and only adjudication will be made by the State
Civil Service Commission [hereinafter referred to as the Com-
mission].' 6 The Commission must hold a public hearing,"7 and
the language of the statute suggests that the action of the Com-
mission will not be reviewable by the courts."' However, case law
clearly sanctions the judicial review of the Commission's deci-
sions."' In Commonwealth v. State Civil Service Commission,12
0
the court held that a Commission decision could be reviewed
pursuant to a variation on the substantial evidence rule.12' Specif-
ically, the court stated that the Commission's findings were not
acceptable unless supported by evidence "sufficient to convince
a reasonable mind to a fair degree of certainty.'12 2 Thus, the court
applies a more stringent test for the sufficiency of evidence than
that applied under the standard notion of substantial evidence.
This variation suggests that Pennsylvania employs a broader re-
view of the merits than would be required in a review under the
substantial evidence rule.
D. New York
If an employee chooses the civil service system for review in
New York, the initial adjudication will be by the appropriate
state or municipal civil service commission [hereinafter collec-
tively referred to as the Commission].12' Again, the statutory
language indicates that the Commission decision is to be final
and conclusive. 24 The courts, however, have not felt estopped
from reviewing the merits of a disciplinary proceeding in which
it is claimed that the Commission acted in a purely arbitrary
115. Id. § 741.951(a).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. § 741.951(c).
119. E.g., East v. Commonwealth, 17 Pa. 199, 331 A.2d 601 (1975); Ogasawara v.
Commonwealth, 9 Pa. 354, 305 A.2d 734 (1973).
120. 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 400, 316 A.2d 676 (1974).
121. Id. at 401, 316 A.2d at 677.
122. Id.
123. N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAw § 76(1) (McKinney 1973).
124. Id. § 76(3).
[Vol. 29
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss2/6
GRIEVANCES AND DuE PROCESS
manner.'" In Pauling v. Smith, '2 this test for review of arbitrary
action was stated as follows: "[Wihether ... the punishment is
'so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circum-
stances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness' ....'"' This
would imply that a judicial review of the merits must produce a
strong negative reaction before a Commission decision would be
reversed rather than produce strong evidence in support of a deci-
sion before such a decision will be upheld, as in Pennsylvania.
Thus, the standard for judicial review of a Commission's decision
in New York is narrower than the usual substantial evidence test.
E. Wisconsin
Wisconsin state employees have a right to request that disci-
plinary actions be reviewed by the State Personnel Board
[hereinafter referred to as the Board] on the basis of "just
cause."' The action of the Board is subject to a judicial review1 29
under a near classic version of the substantial evidence rule. The
courts will not substitute their judgment for the special expertise
of an agency if the record shows a rational basis for the agency's
interpretation.'30 Thus, Wisconsin courts follow a substantial evi-
dence standard in reviewing the merits of a disciplinary action by
the Board.
F. Minnesota and the Federal Government
Straightforward examples of the substantial evidence ap-
proach are evidenced in the Minnesota and the federal civil serv-
ice systems. Federal employees may have adverse personnel ac-
tions reviewed by the Civil Service Commission.'3 ' The determi-
nation of the Commission can be appealed to the Federal Em-
125. Barbanto v. Moses, 31 App. Div. 2d 898, 297 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1969); Trotman v.
Hoberman, 56 Misc. 2d 915, 290 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
126. 46 App. Div. 2d 759, 361 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1974).
127. Id. at 760, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 18. See also Haywood v. Craig Colony, 5 App. Div.
2d 958, 171 N.Y.S.2d 898, modified on other grounds, 6 App. Div. 2d 757, 174 N.Y.S.2d
455 (1958); Plunkett v. Wilson, 179 Misc. 149, 37 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 269 App.
Div. 743, 54 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1942).
128. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1603.05 (West 1972 & Supp. 1977).
129. Id. § 227.15 (West 1957 & Supp. 1977).
130. Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 48 Wis.
2d 272, 179 N.W.2d 805 (1970).
131. 5 C.F.R. §§ 771.101-.119 (1974).
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ployees Appeals Authority [hereinafter referred to as the
FEAA] .132
The FEAA was created by Executive Order No. 11,787,' " and
it maintains a staff of adjudicators who are assigned to make the
final appellate decision in the Civil Service review procedure.134
The final decision by the FEAA is judicially reviewable to deter-
mine if it is arbitrary or capricious or, in other words, to deter-
mine if it is based on substantial evidence.'35
Similarly, Minnesota provides for judicial review in order to
insure that the actions of the State Personnel Board are not arbi-
trary and unreasonable or are not unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole.13 The Minnesota structure
provides for a hearing officer who makes recommendations to the
Board as a preliminary step, rather than an initial, direct review
by the Board. 3
G. Summary
While the review of the five sample jurisdictions is not ex-
haustive, it illustrates the range of grievance procedures available
to public employees under civil service statutes and the degree to
which those procedures have been modified by judicial decision.
At least some degree of judicial review of civil service board deci-
sions is a common element in all five approaches. This review
generally provides a marked contrast to the status of an arbitra-
tor's treatment of the merits in disposing of a contract grievance.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The initial goal of this investigation was to determine the
degree of finality granted to contractual grievance arbitration
awards vis-A-vis the initial adjudicative decision in a statutory
civil service review procedure. In the states covered by the study,
it is clear that the grievance arbitration awards are subject only
to very limited review and, therefore, can be said to possess a high
degree of finality.
It would appear that in most states with comprehensive pub-
132. Id. at §§ 772.101-.312.
133. Exec. Order No. 11,787, 3A C.F.R. 151 (1974).
134. See id.; Vigil v. Post Office Dep't, 406 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1969).
135. Benson v. United States, 421 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1970).
136. Gibson v. Civil Serv. Bd., 285 Minn. 507, 171 N.W.2d 712 (1969).
137. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43.24 (West Supp. 1977).
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lic employee collective bargaining statutes, contractual grievance
arbitration awards can be appealed only to the appropriate state
court. Upon appeal, the grounds for judicial review are essentially
the same as those that apply in the private sector under the
LMRA. Thus, the decision of an arbitrator in a grievance case will
normally be overturned only if the court finds that the arbitrator
failed to comply with the contract, that he was not impartial, that
due process was denied to either party, or that the award was
obtained by fraud, corruption, or other misconduct.'38 Such an
approach virtually precludes a review of the arbitration award
based upon the merits of the case.
Arbitration awards regarding employees' rights in the federal
public sector, arising under Executive Order 11,491,'11 do not
enjoy the high degree of finality accorded such awards in those
states with comprehensive collective bargaining statutes. Ini-
tially, the arbitration procedure will be preempted when the em-
ployee has recourse to a statutory civil service review procedure.'
Additionally, the decision of an arbitrator in the federal sector
may be appealed to the FLRC. The FLRC review is not limited
to the procedural and due process matters noted above. In many
instances, despite the FLRC disclaimer, it appears that the
FLRC does engage in a form of review that could be said to reach
to the merits of the case. 4'
In contrast to the uniform finality of contractual grievance
arbitration awards in the states with comprehensive collective
bargaining statutes, this study has illustrated the existence of
diversity in the review procedures to which initial adjudicative
decisions under a statutory civil service procedure are subject.4 2
Despite this diversity, it can be observed that the decisions
reached at the first adjudicative stages of statutory civil service
review procedures are not generally granted the same degree of
finality accorded arbitration awards.
Some form of substantive, higher level review is inevitable
under a statutory review procedure regarding public employees'
rights. Whether this review is performed by the civil service com-
mission or board or by the courts, it is clear that the review is
138. See notes 69-93 and accompanying text supra.
139. Note 15 supra.
140. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 49-66 and accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 96-137 and accompanying text supra.
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typically not limited to only procedural or due process considera-
tions."I It appears even with judicial review, under the vacillating
standard of the substantial evidence rule, that some form of re-
view on the merits frequently occurs. Whatever the specific cri-
teria, the scope of this review is more expansive than that nor-
mally allowed in cases involving the review of contractual arbitra-
tion awards. This latitude for review is certain to increase the
likelihood that the initial decision will be modified or overturned
by the reviewing body.
These observations lead to the conclusion that contractual
grievance arbitration establishes a more predictable termination
point in the adjudication of discipline-related complaints than
does the statutory civil service review procedure. This lesser de-
gree of finality provided by the civil service review procedure may
be a factor in reducing the attractiveness of such a procedure vis-
A-vis the union-negotiated grievance procedure.
Contractual grievance procedures ending in binding arbitra-
tion offer several other advantages over statutory civil service
review mechanisms. The range of arbitrable issues is usually
broader than that permitted under a statutory review procedure.
Normally, a contractual grievance procedure is triggered where it
has been claimed that the collective bargaining agreement has
been violated.'
In addition, the ultimate dispute-resolution mechanism is
one that the parties to the collective bargaining agreement, i.e.,
the employer and the employees through their union, have mu-
tually formulated and agreed upon. It is obvious that such a
procedure will be more acceptable to employees than a system
unilaterally developed and imposed by the public employer or a
state legislature.
In the same manner, the individual who judges the merits of
the complaint in the final step of a contractual grievance proce-
dure is one mutually chosen by the employee representative and
the employer from a panel of ad hoc professional arbitrators
maintained by a neutral administrative agency. Under a statu-
tory procedure, the initial adjudicator is typically a hearing offi-
cer appointed by the state civil service commission or a person
143. See, e.g., notes 122 and 127 and accompanying text supra. The reviewing body
may overturn or modify the initial adjudication for reasons solely within its discretion,
including a review of the merits. E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 284.390 (1973).
144, See, e.g., note 93 and accompanying text supra.
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selected by the employee from a list provided by the employer. 4 5
Consequently, the neutrality of the adjudicator under a statutory
review procedure is not assured to the same extent as that pro-
vided by contractual grievance arbitration. 4 '
When the salient features of adjudication under a statutory
civil service review procedure are compared with the characteris-
tics of the contractual rights arbitration, it appears that the latter
mechanism generally prevails as the more effective process for
guaranteeing an aggrieved employee a rapid and dispositive reso-
lution of his complaint. The advantages of the union-negotiated
grievance arbitration include savings in time, expense, and trou-
ble as well as the assurance of a neutral adjudication.' 7
The experience in New York, discussed above,'48 lends sup-
port to this observation. The management-proposed system of
submission of all unresolved discipline grievances to binding arbi-
tration, in lieu of the statutory review procedure, has resulted in
a more effective discipline program and a more prompt disposi-
tion of problem cases.'49 Management's attitude in reaction to the
operation of this system has been summarized as follows:
The State approached the arbitral process with a degree of ap-
prehension. It was troubled that arbitrators might not under-
stand the special requirements of public service and might at-
tempt to apply private-sector rules to the resolution of matters
of public-service discipline. These concerns proved to be un-
founded.
A number of critical principles have already emerged from
the arbitral decisions. These include:
-the special responsibilities of employees in custodial situa-
tions
-the special responsibilities of public employees to the public
-the requirement that public employees "work now and grieve
later"-that is, that they must obey an order of a supervisor and
rely on the grievance procedure to question the propriety of the
order
-the requirement that public employees not abuse sick leave
and report for work on time
145. See, e.g., notes 97-101 and accompanying text supra.
146. Fisback, Grievance Arbitration in Public Employee Disciplinary Cases, 22
LAB. L.J. 780, 785 (1971).
147. Osterman & Austin, New York State's Disciplinary Arbitration Procedures, 47
N.Y. ST. B.J. 181, 181-83 (1975).
148. See notes 73-86 and 123-27 and accompanying text supra.
149. See notes 73-86 and accompanying text supra.
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-the fact that certain offenses-such as patient abuse or pos-
session of drugs-are firing offenses.
This is not to say that the State has agreed with all of the
decisions of the arbitrators; but on balance, it seems that the
State is winning the cases that it should win and losing the cases
that it probably should lose.'2 '
Having reached the above conclusions as to the relative effi-
cacy of the two procedures, the issue that is raised is how this
finding is relevant to jurisdictions where public employees do not
bargain collectively and, therefore, have no access to the contrac-
tual grievance arbitration procedure. This issue will be analyzed
with emphasis upon the southeastern United States. A brief ex-
amination and evaluation of the review procedures available to
state employees in the five Southeastern States will be presented.
VI. THE SOUTHEASTERN STATES
Each of the five Southeastern States'5' has some type of sta-
tutory procedure whereby state employees can have discipline-
related actions reviewed. Only Florida has enacted a comprehen-
sive public employee collective bargaining law.'5 2 As most of this
legislation in the Southeast has only recently been promulgated,
there is little interpretive case law specifying the finality of the
adjudications made under this procedure. Therefore, the observa-
tions as to the finality of each procedure will be largely based
upon the relevant statutory language, where it exists.
A. Florida
Section 447.401"11 of the Florida statutes requires that all
collective bargaining agreements between public employers and
public employees shall incorporate a grievance procedure culmi-
nating in final and binding arbitration by a mutually selected,
neutral third party.'54 This provision of the Florida law, though
it has not been interpreted by the courts, appears to be clear as
to its intention and probable effect, since it is similar to the
150. Osterman & Austin, note 147 supra, at 183.
151. See note I supra.
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language in the Pennsylvania and Minnesota bargaining stat-
utes."'5
Florida's State Career Service Law' 56 provides a grievance
procedure whereby eligible state employees may seek review of
the following employment-related actions: "suspension, reduc-
tion in pay, transfer, layoff, demotion, and dismissal."'' 17 Employ-
ees have the option of utilizing the statutory review procedure or
the contractually-provided grievance procedure, if one exists, but
not both.' Under the career service procedure, the review of
disciplinary actions is performed directly by the Career Service
Commission. Actions by the Career Service Commission are re-
viewable by the judiciary on any of the following issues:
1. The Commission did not afford a fair and equitable hearing.
2. The decision of the Commission was not in accordance with
existing statutes or rules and regulations promulgated thereun-
der.
3. The decision of the Commission was not based on substan-
tial evidence." 9
B. Georgia
Georgia's state merit system law' 0 provides that eligible
employees may have those actions reviewed that result in dis-
charges or other adverse actions affecting the individual's com-
pensation or employment status.'6 ' A career service employee"2
may obtain a hearing before a hearing officer appointed by the
State Personnel Board."13 The hearing officer makes recommen-
dations to the Board which then issues a decision as to whether
the disciplinary action was for "proper cause.""' 4 This adjudica-
tive decision of the Board may be submitted to the appropriate
state court for review.'
5
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
179.70 (West 1976).
156. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.022 (Harrison 1975 & Supp. 1976).
157. Id. § 110.061(2)(a) (Harrison Supp. 1976).
158. Id. § 447.401 (Harrison 1977).
159. Id. § 110.061(4) (Harrison 1975). For a general discussion of the status of union-
ism in Florida's public sector, see Nolan, Public Employee Unionism in the Southeast:
The Legal Parameters, 29 S.C.L. Rv. 235, 255-67 (1978).
160. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2201 to -2211 (1975 and Supp. 1977).
161. Id. § 40-2207.1 (Supp. 1977).
162. Id. § 40-2207 (1975).
163. Id. § 40-2204(b)(4).
164. Id. § 40-2207.1(e) (Supp. 1977).
165. Id. § 40-2207.1(h).
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Section 40-2207.1(m)'65 stipulates the following:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the board
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact .... The
court may reverse the decision or order of the board if substan-
tial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the
board's findings, inferences, conclusions, decisions or orders are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the board;
(3) Made upon lawful [sic] procedure;
(4) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(5) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercises of discretion.'
C. North Carolina
In North Carolina, permanent employees' 8 subject to the
State Personnel Act'69 cannot be "discharged, suspended, or re-
duced in pay or position except for just cause."'70 An employee
must be given fifteen days written notice of such disciplinary
action, with both the reasons for the discipline and the em-
ployee's right of review specified."' An aggrieved employee may
then appeal the proposed discipline to his department head.' If
unsatisfied with the department head's disposition of his appeal,
the employee may appeal the disciplinary action to the State
Personnel Commission.
7 3
Upon review, the State Personnel Director or a Commission
designee investigates the incident and may hold a hearing."4 If no
settlement is reached as a result of this investigation and/or hear-
ing, recommendations are made to the Commission by the hear-
ing officer. The Commission, after considering the recommenda-
tions from the hearing officer, makes a final and binding decision
166. Id. § 40-2207.1(m).
167. Id. For a general discussion of the status of unionism in Georgia's public sector,
see Nolan, note 159 supra, at 280-83.
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-34 (Supp. 1975).
169. Id. §§ 126-1 to -16 (1974 & Supp. 1975).
170. Id. § 126-34 (Supp. 1975).
171. Id. § 126-35.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. § 126-37.
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to resolve the dispute.' 7 The statute does not provide for judicial
review of the Commission's decisions in such matters.'
76
D. South Carolina
South Carolina's State Employee Grievance Procedure Act
of 1974 77 requires that each state agency establish an employee
grievance procedure.' 78 Grievable issues "include but are not nec-
essarily limited to classification, dismissal, suspensions, involun-
tary transfers, promotions, and demotions. ' ' 71 This statute also
creates the State Employee Grievance Committee, which consists
of seven members appointed by the State Budget and Control
Board.'8 ° Members are drawn from the career service or appointed
personnel in the several state agencies.'8 '
A permanent state employee'82 who has utilized the depart-
mental grievance procedure and who remains unsatisfied may
appeal to the Committee.' 3 The Committee will hold a hearing
and make a decision in resolution of the grievance. The Commit-
tee's decision is then submitted to the Board.' 4 If the Board does
not reject the Committee's decision within fifteen days, the deci-
sion becomes final. If the Board rejects the Committee's decision,
the Board's resolution of the grievance, which is made without a
hearing, is final and binding.'85 There is no language in the act
pertaining to the judicial review of the adjudications promulgated
under its provisions.'86
175. Id.
176. Though this statute is silent, an aggrieved employee appears to be able to obtain
judicial review of a Commission's decision pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-43 to -52
(Supp. 1975). For a general discussion of unionism in North Carolina's public sector, see
Nolan, note 159 supra, at 287-92.
177. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-17-10 to -40 (1976).
178. Id. § 8-17-20. A caveat should be raised at this point in that the employees of
the railroads operated pursuant to § 54-3-200 have the right to collectively bargain, and
such right may include the right to have an arbitration agreement. Id. § 54-3-210. The
operation of these railroads now lies with the South Carolina Railways Commission. Id.
§§ 58-19-30,-40.
179. Id.
180. Id. § 8-17-30.
181. Id.
182. Id. § 8-17-40.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 8-17-30.
185. Id.
186. Though there is no specific provision for the judicial review of the Board's deci-
sion, review of such a decision may be had pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-280 (Cum.
Supp. Nov. 1977). This statute employs the "clearly erroneous" test. Note 108 and accom-
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E. Virginia
Section 2.1-114.5.D.215 of the Virginia State Personnel Act"'
directs the State Department of Personnel to promulgate
[a]n employee grievance procedure to afford an immediate and
fair method for the resolution of disputes which may arise be-
tween an agency and its employees; however, such procedure
shall not be binding on local school boards nor on employees of
the General Assembly. The term "grievance" as used herein
shall not be interpreted to mean negotiations of wages, salaries,
or fringe benefits."9
As a result of this statutory directive, the state has established a
grievance procedure for state employees."' A grievance under this
procedure is defined as a complaint or dispute regarding the ap-
plication or interpretation of personnel policies or procedures. 9'
After several preliminary steps, the procedure culminates in a
determination by a three or five member panel, chosen by the
aggrieved employee and the employer.'92 The panel members
must be state employees.'93 In order to arrive at the three or five
member panel, the aggrieved employee selects one or two state
employees, and the employer then selects one or two additional
employees to serve as panel members. These panel members, in
turn, select the final panel member, who shall not be an employee
of the agency or department in which the grievance is filed." 4
After a full hearing, this panel issues by majority vote a
decision in resolution of the grievance. This decision is binding
on both the employer and the employee."15 There is no provision
in the statute or the procedure directly sanctioning any form of
judicial review of the panel's decision.'
panying text supra. For a general discussion of unionism in South Carolina's public sector,
see Nolan, note 159 supra, at 292-94.
187. VA. CODE § 2.1-114.5.D.2 (Supp. 1977).
188. Id. §§ 2.1-110 to -116 (1973 & Supp. 1977).
189. Id. § 2.1-114.5. p.2 .
190. Id.
191. Id. The section, prefaced by a directive to the Department of Personnel and
Training regarding the establishment of employee-management relations, provides: "The
term 'grievance' as used herein shall not be interpreted to mean negotiations of wages,
salaries or fringe benefits." Id.





196. In addition, Virginia's Administrative Process Act, VA. CODE § 9-6.14:20 (Supp.
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F. Observations
The statutory review procedures available to state employees
in the Southeast appear to fit the general pattern of statutory
civil service systems. While each procedure varies slightly, a
major focus is usually on the review of discipline-related actions.
In Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, the
final adjudicative decision is made by a commission or board
appointed by the governor or other administrative officials
within the state government.'97 Virginia provides for a decision by
a three or five member panel of fellow state employees.'98 The
statutory review procedure in each of these five states is adminis-
tered by either the state department of personnel, a body ap-
pointed by the governor or by public management.'99 Thus, the
state government maintains a significant degree of control over
these procedures and their adjudications.
In Florida and Georgia, administrative adjudications are re-
viewable by the appropriate state court.211 In North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Virginia, the procedures make no explicit
1977), expressly exempts "from the operation of this chapter any agency action relating
to the following subjects . . . (v) the selection, tenure, dismissal, direction, or control of
any office or employee of an agency or the state." For a general discussion of unionism in
Virginia's public sector, see Nolan, note 159 supra, at 298-302.
197. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.403 (Harrison 1977) provides for a final review by the
legislative body in the event of an impasse. The legislature, after considering the findings
of fact and recommendations of the special master, at a public hearing shall "take such
action as it deems to be in the public interest."
In Georgia, the final decision is to be made by the State Personnel Board, as provided
in GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2207 (Supp. 1977). The members of the Board are appointed by
the Governor, pursuant to GA. CONST. of 1945 art. XIV, § I, para. 1, which provision was
expressly continued by the Executive Reorganization Act of 1972, 1972 Ga. Laws 1015, §
7.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-37 (Supp. 1975) vests final decision-making authority in the
State Personnel Commission, whose members are appointed by the Governor. In South
Carolina, the State Employee Grievance Committee makes the final decision. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 8-17-30 (1976). Its members are appointed by the State Budget and Control Board.
Id. For the structure of the powerful Budget and Control Board, see id. § 1-11-10.
198. See note 192 supra.
199. Florida's statutory review procedure is administered by the Public Employees
Relations Commission, whose members are appointed by the Governor. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 447.207 (Harrison 1977). The procedures are administered by the state personnel depart-
ments in Georgia and North Carolina, see note 197 supra, and by the State Personnel
Division in South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-17-40 (1976). Virginia's procedures are
overseen by its Department of Personnel and Training, VA. CODE §§ 2.1-11.4.5.D.1, .2
(Supp. 1977), whose members are appointed by the Governor. VA. CODE § 2.1-113 (Supp.
1977).
200. See notes 159 & 161 and accompanying text supra.
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provision for the judicial review of the final administrative adju-
dication.20" '
Only in Florida do state employees have access to a union-
negotiated review mechanism which culminates in a binding ad-
judication by a mutually selected, neutral third party. Florida
state employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement can
obtain this neutral adjudication through the contractual griev-
ance procedure.2
It is difficult to determine the efficacy of the statutory review
procedures in the Southeast. As all these procedures are relatively
new, few statistics or interpretative court decisions exist that
would facilitate such an evaluation. With this caveat, the follow-
ing observations may be made as to the structural shortcomings
of these procedures:
1. Because of the absence of the mutual selection of a neutral
third party adjudicator, there is no firm guarantee that an ag-
grieved employee will receive a neutral adjudication of his com-
plaint.
2. Due to the fact that the agencies or bodies charged with
the administration and enforcement of these procedures are gen-
erally part of the state management group, the neutral adminis-
tration and enforcement of these procedures is not assured.
3. There are no provisions in any of the statutory procedures
to insure good faith compliance by employers.
4. There are no provisions in any of the relevant legislation to
protect employees who file for review from retaliation by the
employer.
Based on these factors and on the other failings of such proce-
dures discussed above,20 3 a strong possibility may exist that the
present statutory review procedures in the southeastern United
States do not sufficiently maintain due process for state employ-
ees in their employment.
Statistics from Virginia act to support the above conclusion.
There are approximately 60,000 employees covered by the proce-
dure promulgated under the state's grievance procedure statute.
In the first twenty-six months of the procedure's existence, from
April 1, 1974 to June 30, 1976, a total of 259 grievances were
201. See notes 176, 186 & 196 and accompanying text supra.
202. See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
203. See notes 197.202 and accompanying test supra.
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filed. 24 This small number of grievances indicates that either
there is an unusually small number of employment-related prob-
lems in Virginia, or more likely, that state employees are not
aware of the procedure or are not using it. A review system can
only be successful if employees feel confident about its effective-
ness and protection.
VII. A PROPOSED REVIEW PROCEDURE FOR STATE EMPLOYEES IN THE
SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES
The existing review mechanisms in the Southeastern States
may require modification if they are to guarantee due process
rights to state employees. Drawing upon the results of this study,
a model statutory procedure is proposed in an attempt to maxim-
ize the guarantee of due process rights for the employee while
proving workable in the labor relations environment extant in the
Southeast. Because of its general nature, the procedure may re-
quire slight modification to make it suitable to any particular
state.
A. The Guarantee of Due Process
As the goal of the proposed review procedure is to guarantee
state employees their due process rights, it is necessary to define
these rights. Therefore, the statute creating the review mecha-
nism should incorporate the following language:
No state employee will be discharged or disciplined without just
cause.
The concept of just cause for discipline is the most basic and
widely accepted principle of sound discipline. 25 The stipulation
204. VA. STATE DEP'T OF PERSONNEL, SUMMARY OF GRIEVANCES FILED UNDER THE
STATE'S UNIFORM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE, (Apr. 1, 1974 to May 31, 1975, and July 1, 1975
to June 30, 1976).
205. A full discussion of the principle of "just cause" is not within the scope of this
article. However, the basic concept is well summarized by the following excerpt from
GRIEVANCE GUIDE (BNA) (1972):
- Was the employer's rule or order reasonably related to efficient and safe
operations?
- Did management investigate before administering the discipline? The
investigation normally should be made before the decision to discipline is made.
Where immediate action is required, however, the best course is to suspend the
employee pending investigation with the understanding that he will be restored
to his job and paid for time lost if he is found not guilty.
- Was the investigation fair and objective?
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that management will discipline or discharge employees only for
just cause is incorporated in the majority of collective bargaining
agreements."' The inclusion of this provision guarantees to the
employees that they will not be disciplined or discharged for arbi-
trary or capricious reasons.
Such an inclusion would serve two purposes. First, it would
codify the due process guarantee. Second, it would provide the
individuals who adjudicate grievances with a basis for determin-
ing the merit of any request for review.
By limiting the scope of reviewable actions to discharge and
other discipline-related matters, it would be possible to avoid
overloading the procedure with petty complaints. Such a limita-
tion would not significantly reduce the guarantee of due process
to employees since the protection against arbitrary discipline is
the primary component of this guarantee. This limitation would
also relieve an employer's fears that the procedure would be used
as a means to achieve de facto collective bargaining over
employment-related matters such as wages and working condi-
tions.
B. A Model Grievance Procedure
The core of the proposed system is a uniform grievance pro-
cedure which would cover all non-policy-making state employees.
The grievance procedure would culminate in binding arbitration
by a neutral third party mutually selected by the employee and
the employer. The following procedure is offered as a prototype.
When an employee is dissatisfied with his discharge or other
discipline-related action taken by the employer, he shall be able
- Did the investigation produce substantial evidence or proof of guilt? It is
not required that the evidence be preponderant, conclusive, or "beyond reasona-
ble doubt," except where the alleged misconduct is of such a criminal or repre-
hensible nature as to stigmatize the employee and seriously impair his chances
for future employment.
- Were the rules, orders, and penalties applied even-handedly and without
discrimination? If enforcement has been lax in the past, management can't
suddenly reverse its course and begin to crack down without first warning em-
ployees of its intent.
- Was the penalty reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and
the past record? If employee A's past record is significantly better than that of
employee B, the company properly may give A a lighter punishment than B for
the same offense.
206. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 40:1 (1975).
Seventy-nine percent of the collective bargaining agreements surveyed contained a
"cause" or "just cause" provision.
[Vol. 29
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to seek a review of such action pursuant to the following proce-
dure:
First Step: The Employee and his Immediate Supervisor
(1) Within three working days of the action giving rise to the
grievance, the employee will register his complaint with his
immediate supervisor.
(2) The grievance is not written at this point.
(3) The immediate supervisor shall respond to the grievance
within three working days.
Second Step: The Employee and the Department Head
(1) If the employee is dissatisfied with the employer's response
at Step One, he will advance the grievance in writing to the
department head within three working days.
(2) The grievance becomes a formal written grievance at this
step.
(3) The department head shall respond in writing to the em-
ployee within three working days.
Third Step: The Employee and the Agency or Operation
Head
(1) If the employee is dissatisfied with the employer's response
at Step Two, he will advance the grievance in writing to the
agency or operation head within five working days.
(2) The agency or operation head shall respond in writing to
the employee within five working days.
Fourth Step: The Employee and the State Director of Per-
sonnel (or his appointee)
(1) If the employee is dissatisfied with the employer's response
at Step Three, he will advance the grievance in writing to the
State Director of Personnel within five working days.
(2) The State Director of Personnel (or his appointee) shall
respond in writing to the grievance within ten days.
Fifth Step: Grievance Arbitration
(1) If the employee is dissatisfied with the employer's response
at Step Four, he shall request in writing, within five working
days, that the grievance be submitted to final and binding arbi-
tration.
(2) The arbitrator shall decide whether the grievant was dis-
charged or disciplined for just cause.
(3) If the grievance is upheld, the arbitrator shall have the
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authority to order appropriate remedial action, including, if
appropriate, reinstatement with full backpay.
To insure the prompt disposition of grievances, the time lim-
its should be strictly enforced. Failure by the employer to respond
to a grievance within the specified time period at each step shall
result in the resolution of the grievance in favor of the employee.
In a similar manner, failure of the employee to advance his griev-
ance to the next step of the procedure within the time limits
shall result in the grievance being resolved in favor of the em-
ployer.
To enhance employee acceptance and support of the mecha-
nism and to insure adequate representation of the grievant, the
enabling statute should provide that each aggrieved individual be
allowed to choose a representative at the latter stages of the griev-
ance procedure. While this suggestion will surely prompt adverse
reaction from some public policy makers, it is well-founded. It is
difficult to argue that the majority of rank and file employees
could deal on an equal basis with the people in top management
or represent themselves competently in an arbitration proceed-
ing. Therefore, once a grievance progresses to the third step, the
grievant should be allowed to have another individual present as
his spokesperson or advisor.
The statutory grievance procedure should incorporate one
further characteristic. To insure prompt and efficacious adjudica-
tion of unresolved grievances, the statute should sanction a form
of arbitration that is as simple and non-technical as feasible,
while still guaranteeing both parties procedural due process.
Thus, it is suggested that evidentiary rules be made as accommo-
dating as possible, that hearing transcripts not be allowed, and
that post-hearing briefs be barred except in discharge cases.
C. Protection of Employees Against Employer Retaliation
To insure good faith compliance with the procedure, explicit
language should be included in the enabling legislation which
would prohibit employer retaliation against employees who file
grievances. The simplest way to enforce this proscription of em-
ployer retaliation is to make such management actions the basis
for a separate grievance. Because of the special nature of such
retaliation grievances, the review of this grievance should origi-
nate at the fourth step of the procedure, i.e., the presentation of
the grievance directly to the state director of personnel.
[Vol. 29
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D. Neutral Administrative Agency
As discussed above, a major problem with most statutory
review procedures is the fact that they are administered by mem-
bers of the public management group. Therefore, it is suggested
that a truly neutral, autonomous agency or commission be cre-
ated to administer the prepared review procedure. The functions
of this agency would be so limited as to require that it consist of
only a part-time chairman, two part-time members, and a full-
time executive director. The three commission members, ap-
pointed by the governor, would be chosen for their expertise in
labor relations and their ability to perform their duties in an
objective, impartial manner.
This State Employees Appeals Commission would serve
three functions:
(1) To evaluate and appoint qualified neutrals to a panel of ad
hoc arbitrators;
(2) to provide five-member lists of arbitrators from which the
particular employer and the employee in the fifth step of its
grievance procedure would mutually select, by an alternate
striking of names, arbitrators; and
(3) to rule, when necessary, that a grievance is resolved based
upon one of the parties' failure to meet the prescribed time
limits for replying to a grievance or for failing to advance a
grievance to the next step of the procedure.
The Commission, thus, would not engage in any adjudication of
grievances, but rather would facilitate the efficient operation of
the procedure. The fees of the arbitration would be paid by the
Commission.
E. Specification of the Grounds for Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards
The major advantage of this proposed procedure over exist-
ing review mechanisms is the prompt resolution of disputes.
Therefore, it is important that the enabling statute specify the
grounds for the judicial review of the arbitration awards in a
manner that will prevent substantive review of the merits and a
delay in reaching a final resolution. The following language is
suggested:
The decision of the arbitrator shall be reviewable in the appro-
priate state court. The court shall vacate the arbitrator's award
only on the following grounds:
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(1) Fraud, corruption, or other serious procedural irregu-
larity in obtaining the award;
(2) partiality on the part of the arbitrator;
(3) action by the arbitrator that exceeds his statutory
authority; or
(4) failure of the arbitrator to issue a final and definite
award.
By limiting court review to questions of procedural and arbitral
regularity, this provision would insure that the adjudications pro-
duced under the procedure would, in most cases, be dispositive
of the grievance.
VIII. SUMMARY
It is the aim of this article to encourage state officials in the
Southeast to review critically and objectively the existing griev-
ance procedures now available to state employees within their
jurisdictions. The results reported above indicate that those sta-
tutory procedures, when compared to a contractual grievance
arbitration procedure, fall short of fully guaranteeing state em-
ployees due process in their employment.
Based upon this premise, a statutory procedure which incor-
porates the essential characteristics of a contractually provided
grievance arbitration without requiring the presence of collective
bargaining or of a union has been outlined. Thus, the proposed
review mechanism should prove workable in states where collec-
tive bargaining is neither sanctioned nor advocated by the major-
ity of public officials.
There is an urgent need for those who promulgate public
policy in the Southeast to consider seriously the problem of guar-
anteeing to public employees fair treatment on the job. The pro-
cedure put forth above will fill the void which can arguably be
said to exist in states where public employee collective bargaining
is not widespread or acceptable. If this problem is not confronted
and solved by enlightened legislators and public managers, the
eventual result may well be the emergence of a burgeoning de-
mand by public employees for full collective bargaining rights.
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